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Abstract: This essay is a series of reflections on the implications of Philip Morris for the 
tort reform movement.  I make an effort below to find a middle ground between the 
positions of the plaintiff and defendant in Philip Morris.  That middle ground involves 
largely returning to the Supreme Court’s pre-Gore treatment of punitive damages and 
introducing new procedural devices for defendants to challenge awards.  I close with a 
few observations on the implications of this case law for pain and suffering awards. 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu.  I thank participants 
at the AALS Annual Meeting 2007 for helpful responses. 
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This paper is an outgrowth of remarks I prepared for a panel on tort reform and proposals 
to limit remedies,1 a potentially broad topic encompassing many different perspectives.  
However, in light of current events the topic can be narrowed to one question, punitive 
damages and tort reform, and more specifically to one case: Philip Morris v. Williams.2  
The Supreme Court held in Philip Morris that a punitive damage award that punishes a 
defendant for harm inflicted on persons who are not before the court is a taking of 
property in violation of the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.3 
 
I must disclose that I was involved in Philip Morris, though somewhat tangentially.  I 
was drawn into the case, as I was in State Farm v. Campbell,4 as an amicus for the 
plaintiff – that is, the party trying to hold on to the large punitive award ($79.5 million in 
this case, $145 million in State Farm).  In both cases, I was asked by the plaintiffs to file 
a brief to the Supreme Court addressing the question of deterrence theory and punitive 
damages.  In both cases, I faced the same opponents: A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven 
Shavell, who were asked by the defendants in Philip Morris and in State Farm to file 
deterrence theory briefs.5  I continue to find it interesting that the litigating parties want to 
have law-and-economics arguments addressed directly to the Court.  I hope that it reflects 
an accurate perception of the Court’s interest in hearing these arguments.  However, I 
found no evidence in the State Farm and Philip Morris opinions that the Court paid any 
attention to the law-and-economics arguments offered by the opposing sides. 
 
My involvement on the side of the trial lawyers in the last two big Supreme Court cases 
on punitive damages strikes me to be ironic in some respects.  I am not a natural political 
ally of the trial lawyers.  In fact, I have taken positions on some controversial topics that 
probably would be repellent to the interest groups typically associated with trial lawyers.6  
And yet I might appear to tort reform proponents to have become something of a 
gunslinger for the trial lawyers in recent major punitive damages cases.  A similar irony 
has been perceived, I suspect, by the state court judges in Utah and in Oregon that have 
been involved in these cases.  In terms of the divide between red (conservative) and blue 
(liberal) states, I don’t think you can get more “red” than Utah.  The Utah judges 
responsible for State Farm are probably among the most conservative in the nation. And 
while Oregon is not a red state, I am not aware of accusations that its judiciary is 
especially favorable toward plaintiffs’ lawyers.  Why we would observe the most 
                                                 
1 For the panel description, see http://www.aals.org/am2007/wednesday/remedies.htm.  
2 Philip Morris USA v. William, 05-1256, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1332 (2007).  This essay began as a set of 
remarks on the case before it was decided.  It has obviously evolved since then to include a critique of the 
decision. 
3 Id. at *13. 
4 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
5 Although we have faced off in two high-stakes cases, I have long considered both Steve and Mitch to be 
friends. 
6 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Minimum Contract Terms, with Implications for Labor Law, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1746 n.22 (1996) (arguing that most research indicates that minimum wage laws reduce 
the welfare of low-skilled workers); An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain, 83 Geo. L. J. 19, 65 
(1994) (explaining that workers have short horizons and are therefore likely to favor inefficient decisions 
when a firm is failing); Law and the Future of Organized Labor in America, 49 Wayne L. Rev. 685, 696 
(arguing that employer hostility has little to do with the decline of unions). 
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controversial punitive damage cases coming out of moderate to conservative states is a 
question that is interesting on its own, and I will return to later. 
 
This essay is a series of reflections on the implications of Philip Morris for the tort 
reform movement, a movement for which I share considerable sympathy.  First, I offer an 
ideal approach to punitive damages, based on my amicus brief in Philip Morris, and 
apply that approach to the case.  I make an effort to find a middle ground between the 
positions of the plaintiff and defendant – because in any case that reaches the Supreme 
Court one will find persuasive arguments to be made on both sides.  That middle ground 
involves largely returning to the Supreme Court’s pre-Gore treatment of punitive 
damages and introducing new procedural devices for defendants to challenge awards.  
Second, I examine some of the troubling implications of Philip Morris, such as the 
possibility that class actions are unconstitutional under its theory of due process.  Finally,  
I close with a few observations on the implications of this case law for pain and suffering 
awards.  The likely eventual outcome of decisions such as Philip Morris and State Farm 
will be a constitutionally-based requirement for the scheduling of pain and suffering 
awards. 
 
Part I summarizes the case.  In Part II, I lay out an ideal approach to punitive damages 
based on the arguments I’ve made in briefs to the Supreme Court in the major punitive 
damages cases.  I invest more effort here in attempting to address the concerns of 
defendants than was possible in the briefs.  In Part III, I discuss the troubling implications 
of Philip Morris, and Part IV concludes. 
 
 
I. The Case 
 
The facts of Philip Morris are simple.  The husband of Mayola Williams (Jesse Williams, 
but for simplicity I will refer to him as “the husband”) began smoking cigarettes in the 
early 1950s,7 the time period in which the cigarette companies were becoming fully 
aware of the health risks connected to smoking while refusing to issue any warnings 
publicly.  This is also before the introduction of the Surgeon General’s warning on every 
pack of cigarettes.8  In the period in which the husband took up smoking, cigarette 
companies were not simply refusing to disclose health risks; they were publicly denying 
health risk claims and even paying spokespeople to publicly reject claims that cigarettes 
were linked to cancer.9  This is all beyond debate from what I gather; it is well 
understood that there was a significant period during which the conduct of the major 
cigarette companies could be described as the perpetration of a fraud on the cigarette 
consuming public. 
 
                                                 
7 Williams v. Philip Morris USA, 48 P.3d 824, 829 (Or. App. 2002); vacated and remanded, 2007 U.S. 
LEXIS 1332. 
8 Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 36, 
§§ 1331 et seq.). 
9 STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 2 (1996) 
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The husband continued to smoke for the rest of his life until he died from lung cancer in 
1997.10  Mayola Williams brought a tort suit in Oregon claiming fraud against Philip 
Morris.  She claimed that her husband relied on the denials of health risks from the 
company, and that this reliance was a major reason that he continued to smoke.11  Of 
course, she also claimed that the lung cancer was caused by smoking.  The jury found 
Philip Morris liable and included a punitive award for $79.5 million dollars, which is 
equal to the company’s profits for a 2.5 week period in the year in which the judgment 
was awarded.12  The $79.5 million punitive award was reduced by the trial judge, 
restored by the appeals court, and eventually upheld by the Supreme Court of Oregon.13 
 
Philip Morris challenged the large punitive award in the U.S. Supreme Court on grounds 
that go the core of deterrence argument for punitive damages.  Philip Morris argued that, 
in light of State Farm, it is never constitutionally permissible to multiply an award to take 
into account harms to people other than the plaintiff before the court.14  On February 20, 
2007 the Supreme Court issued an opinion agreeing with Philip Morris’s argument, 
vacating the judgment and remanding the case to the Oregon Supreme Court. 
 
Philip Morris announces the bold proposition that the Constitution’s Due Process Clause 
does not permit a jury to base a punitive award on the desire to punish a defendant for 
harming persons who are not before the court.15  Such an award would amount to a taking 
                                                 
10 Williams v. Philip Morris USA, 48 P.3d 824, at 829. 
11 Despite encouragement from his wife and children to stop smoking because cigarettes were dangerous to 
his health, Williams continued because he insisted that cigarette companies would not sell a dangerous 
product and that the companies never said anything about smoking being harmful.  Williams told his family 
that he heard on television that cigarettes did not cause cancer and that he read articles asserting that 
cigarette smoking was not dangerous.  Williams eventually made attempts to stop smoking but they were 
all unsuccessful.  Id. at 829. 
12 Id. at 841. 
13 There are details that my sketch in the text leaves out.  The trial court found for Mayola Williams on both 
the negligence and fraud claims, and awarded her $21,485.80 in economic damages and $800,000 in non-
economic damages.  Williams v. Philip Morris, 48 P.3d at 828.  The jury awarded $79.5 million for 
punitive damages on the fraud claim.  Id.  The trial judge reduced the punitive damage award to $32 million 
on the ground that the $79.5 million was unconstitutionally excessive.  Id.  The trial judge also reduced the 
non-economic damages to $500,000 in accordance with Oregon’s statutory cap on punitive damages.  Id.  
Mayola Williams appealed the reduction of punitive damages and Philip Morris appealed rulings related to 
the fraud and negligence claims.  Id.  The Court of Appeals of Oregon affirmed the trial court’s decision on 
the fraud claim, and, after finding that the jury’s award was not excessive under the guidelines set by 
Oregon’s high court and the U.S. Supreme Court, reversed the trial judge’s reduction of punitive damages.  
Id. at 842.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded the case back to the 
Court of Appeals for reconsideration consistent with State Farm.  Philip Morris v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 
(2003).  On remand, the Oregon appeals court upheld its previous ruling that the $79.5 million punitive 
damages award was not unconstitutionally excessive. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 92 P.3d 126 (Or. 
App. 2004).  In 2006, the Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals.  Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc.  127 P.3d 1165 (Ore. 2006).  The United States Supreme 
Court has granted certiorari to review the punitive damages award.  Philip Morris v. Williams, 05-1256, 
2006 U.S. LEXIS 4161 (2006); vacated and remanded, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1332. 
14 Philip Morris USA, 2007 LEXIS 1332, at *10-11. 
15 Id. at *13. 
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of property without due process.16  However, Philip Morris also holds that harm to others 
can be considered as part of the reprehensibility analysis in a punitive damages case.17 
 
 
II. The Theory of Deterrence and Punitive Awards 
 
I have made simple points in my briefs to the Court on punitive damages.  Punitive 
awards serve one of either two functions: they internalize losses that are not effectively 
internalized through compensatory damages, and they eliminate gains from offensive 
conduct.18  The theory of damages has been developed over centuries, starting with 
philosophers of law like Beccaria and Bentham.19  My contribution in this area has been 
to synthesize these arguments, to provide additional rigor where necessary, and to apply 
them to the punitive damages case law.20 
 
The internalization theory gives us one justification for multiplying compensatory 
awards.  Under this theory, it is appropriate to multiply a punitive award in order to make 
up for the number of times that a tortfeasor gets away with harming people without 
having to pay any damages.  Thus, if a tortfeasor’s conduct imposes a loss of $100 on 
someone every day, and only one out of two of those victims sue for the loss, a proper 
damage award for internalization would be $200.  In this case, the additional $100 added 
to the compensatory award is a punitive award designed to internalize the total losses 
imposed on society. 
 
The gain elimination theory offers an alternative perspective on the function of a punitive 
award.  Under this theory, an award should never be less than the profit earned by the 
offender from some offensive act.  Suppose, for example, that the offender does some 
offensive act that imposes a loss on the victim of $100 and also leads to a gain to the 
offender of $500.  If the damage award is limited to the compensatory (internalization) 
level, the offender will still gain $400 from his conduct even after being forced to pay a 
compensatory damage award.  The gain-eliminating approach would require a penalty no 
less than $500.  Thus, in this example, the court would issue a compensatory award of 
$100 and a punitive judgment of at least $400. 
 
When should a court choose internalization, and when gain-elimination?  Gain 
elimination is appropriate when the offender’s conduct is always socially undesirable or 
when it amounts to a nonconsensual taking of some sort.21  Under these conditions, 
complete deterrence is the appropriate goal.  Internalization is appropriate for the 
                                                 
16 Id. at *23. 
17 Id. at *16-17. 
18 Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO L.J. 421 (1998). 
19 Id., at 425-427; Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Keith N. Hylton, et al. in Support of Respondents, 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 05-1256, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1332 (2007) (No. 05-1256). 
20 Hylton, supra note 18, at 430-460; Keith N. Hylton (2005) The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of 
Criminal Law, Review of Law & Economics: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2, Article 1, available at: 
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss2/art1.  
21 Hylton, supra note 18, at 439-444. 
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remaining cases – e.g., where the defendant’s conduct is in general socially desirable, but 
it nevertheless imposes losses on victims. 
 
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell wrote an article arguing that the internalization 
theory should be used to determine punitive damage awards.22  I disagree.  The vast 
majority of punitive damages cases involve conduct that is always socially undesirable or 
involving a taking of some sort.  These cases are appropriate for the gain elimination 
(complete deterrence) theory.  The total damage award in these cases should be no less 
than the level required to eliminate the offender’s gain from the harmful conduct. 
 
 
III. Applying Theory to Philip Morris 
 
The Oregon courts never explained precisely what the punitive award was designed to do 
in Philip Morris.  The court never explained whether it was designed to internalize losses 
suffered by other smokers, or eliminate part of Philip Morris’s profits.  However, the 
court’s decision to use the company’s profit as a basis for calculating punitive damages 
suggests that the court was attempting to eliminate the company’s gain from fraudulent 
conduct.23 
 
The theory of penalties set out above suggests that this is perfectly sensible.  Philip 
Morris, and other cigarette companies operating during the period of time after health 
risks were largely understood by cigarette makers and before health warnings became 
routine, engaged in a fraud on the public.  They sold cigarettes without revealing the 
information they held privately on the health risks of smoking.  Indeed, they deliberately 
issued or procured from others false statements regarding the health risks of smoking.24  
They did this in order to continue to sell cigarettes in high numbers.  This is conduct that 
is unambiguously socially undesirable. 
 
Under the theory of penalties, the proper penalty is one that eliminates the gain enjoyed 
by Philip Morris from each fraudulent transaction during the period in which the 
company engaged in fraud.  This could be a lot of money.  The amount depends on the 
length of the period in which unambiguous fraud took place and the number of 
transactions that could be described as fraudulent.  Perhaps the period of fraud is not that 
long.  Perhaps the companies themselves were unsure of the health risks for most of the 
period before the imposition of the Surgeon General’s warning.  However, it is generally 
accepted, I believe, that the companies came to a rather complete understanding of the 
health risks at some point in time before they began to publicly admit them.  The period 
after the more-or-less full understanding was acquired and before the public admissions 
of health risks is the window period in which unambiguous fraud took place.  Under the 
                                                 
22 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 
869 (1998). 
23 Williams v. Philip Morris USA, 48 P.3d at 841. 
24 GLANTZ, supra note 7, at 171-199; ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND 
DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA (Basic Books, 2007); Howard Markel, 
Tracing the Cigarette’s Path from Sexy to Deadly, New York Times, March 20, 2007, available at 
www.nytimes.com/2007/03/20/health/20essay.html.  
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gain-elimination approach, the profits that can be attributed to the fraud should be 
eliminated. 
 
It has been suggested that a large damage awarding imposed so long after the period of 
fraudulent conduct might be ineffective because it merely punishes the current set of 
Philip Morris shareholders without really imposing a penalty on the officers and owners 
who were present during the period of fraudulent conduct.25  The flaw in this argument is 
its implication that a penalty imposed tomorrow for offensive conduct today should be 
viewed as ineffective.  That implication is wrong.  A rational actor who engages in 
offensive conduct today should, under an ideal legal system, anticipate punishment in the 
future.  Under an ideal system, the punishment should be sufficient to eliminate any gains 
the bad actor enjoys today – taking into account the time-value of money.26 
 
The theory offered here suggests that the $79.5 million punitive judgment against Philip 
Morris may have been appropriate as a matter of deterrence policy.  Indeed, the theory 
suggests that the large punitive award probably was appropriate and may have been far 
less than the amount required to provide the proper deterrent signal to firms that consider 
engaging in fraud. 
 
A. Some Extremely Important Questions of Detail 
 
There are questions of detail that may lead to a different answer than the one I have 
suggested so far.  For example, we do not know if Mayola Williams’s husband really 
relied on the fraudulent statements of Philip Morris during the period in which he 
smoked.  The trial court found that he did, but perhaps he did not.  Perhaps he would 
have continued smoking even if Philip Morris had revealed most of the key, 
uncontestable findings on health risks to the smokers of their cigarettes. 
 
There is also the problem of redundant penalties.  Suppose Philip Morris had already 
paid settlements or damage judgments for some of the same transactions as the one 
involved in this lawsuit.  To the extent Philip Morris had already settled, it should not be 
forced to pay again. 
 
Even if Mayola Willliam’s husband relied on the fraudulent statements of Philip Morris, 
maybe some of the other Oregon citizens who smoked at the same time as he did not rely 
on those statements.  If they did not, then it would be inappropriate to treat the sales to 
them as fraudulent transactions.  The gain-eliminating portion of any penalty assessed on 
behalf of those consumers should be reduced accordingly. 
 
B. The Core Issue: Aggregation and Claim Heterogeneity  
 
                                                 
25 Amicus Curiae Brief of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and the Cato Institute in Support of 
Petitioner, Philip Morris USA, Williams, 05-1256, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1332 (2007) (No. 05-1256), at 5. 
26 Brief of Keith N. Hylton as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 
P.3d 82  (2005) (No. S121723), at 36-42. 
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The core issue in Philip Morris, as in State Farm, is whether a court is permitted to 
consider the harm to others in calculating a punitive award.  That is, after all, how a court 
winds up with a damage award of almost $80 million to one smoker. 
 
To take a simple example, suppose the defendant commits fraud against 10 people every 
year, and gets sued only once.  Each time the defendant commits fraud, it steals $10 from 
its victim.  The damage award to the individual victim is only $10.  However, if the court 
considers the damage to others over the year of the defendant’s conduct, the sum comes 
up to $100 ($10 loss to the victim plus $90 loss to others). 
 
This simple example captures the central economic issue in the Supreme Court’s recent 
punitive damage cases.  On one hand, as many courts and commentators have wondered, 
why let one plaintiff who suffered a loss of $10 walk away with a judgment of $100?  
Wouldn’t this guarantee a long list of plaintiffs, some of whom may not have suffered 
any harm at all?  Doesn’t this approach treat all potential plaintiffs the same, when in fact 
their stories may differ greatly?  On the other hand, if most victims of fraud don’t sue, 
failing to award punitive damages is equivalent to giving the green light to perpetrators of 
fraud.  If, after all, I can commit sufficient fraud to strip people of a total of $100 per 
year, and then expect to pay only $10 in damages, then I’ll find the fraud business a good 
racket to stay in for life. 
 
The questions raised here are observed both in a substantial class of punitive damages 
cases and in class actions.  In both sets of cases, the core problem is whether issues are 
general to the class or individualized.  To return to my example above, if all of the issues 
are general to the class of victims, there is nothing wrong, in deterrence terms, in 
stripping the defendant of the total harm he has imposed on victims ($100) with one 
punitive damages judgment.  Similarly, there would be nothing wrong in that case, on 
deterrence grounds, in recognizing a class of victims and allowing them to collect $100.  
But if the issues are not general to the class, then there certainly are potential problems in 
recognizing a class.  The aggregated or multiplied judgment could vastly exceed the 
socially optimal penalty and could therefore over-deter the defendant’s conduct.  For this 
reason it is possible to defend on economic grounds the decisions of some courts, as in 
the recent Florida $145 billion smokers case, to refuse to certify classes in which the 
issues are too individualized to justify a class wide judgment.27 
 
The core of the problem in punitive and class actions is the same.  In punitive cases, we 
are looking at an award that is designed to provide a remedy for or penalty on behalf of 
the potential plaintiffs who are not present in court.  In class actions, we are looking at an 
award that is designed to provide a remedy for or penalty on behalf of plaintiffs who are 
there in court in only a fictional sense, while being represented by one particular plaintiff.  
In both cases, an award that strips all illicit gains or internalizes the aggregate harm is 
based on an extrapolation, aggregation, or multiplication of the gain to the offender or 
harm to the victim observed in the offender’s conduct toward a single representative 
plaintiff. 
 
                                                 
27 Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fl. 2000). 
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State Farm confused the core issue by addressing the enforcement of rights of citizens of 
particular states with different legal systems.28  The more important question is whether a 
multiplied award effectively creates a class out of a group with individualized issues.  
And this problem exists whether the victims are all state residents or residents of other 
states. 
 
In view of this core issue, when is aggregation or multiplication of damages appropriate 
on deterrence grounds?  There are a few problems that make damages for the missing 
plaintiffs difficult to aggregate.  One is that some of the missing plaintiffs may be under a 
different legal regime, specifically a regime in which the defendant’s conduct would be 
lawful.  This was the issue that bothered the Court in State Farm.  A second issue is that 
even if the law governing the plaintiff and the missing plaintiffs is uniform, perhaps those 
plaintiffs have very different cases.  Some plaintiffs may have been guilty of negligence 
themselves.  Some plaintiffs may have suffered harm from some other cause.  In other 
words, causation and contributory fault defenses may vary across the population of 
victims, and this may make aggregation inappropriate and a damage multiplier 
inappropriate too.  All of these issues can be summed up by the label claim heterogeneity. 
 
Whether claim heterogeneity makes aggregation or multiplication inappropriate on 
deterrence grounds is also a function of the nature of the offender’s conduct.  If the 
defendant’s conduct is either expropriative or uniformly harmful on welfare grounds, 
there is no reason to worry about overdeterrence of the offender’s conduct.  Complete 
deterrence of the offender’s conduct is the socially appropriate goal.  Given this, there is 
no reason on deterrence grounds to limit aggregation because of the problem of claim 
heterogeneity.  To return to my earlier numerical example, suppose an offender’s 
transactions with each one of 10 victims are unambiguously fraudulent, leading to a loss 
of $10 to 9 of the victims and only $1 to the last victim.  Suppose the court imposed a 
total damage award of $100 on the offender.  This would appear to over-internalize the 
harm suffered by the last victim.  However, since the offender’s conduct offers no social 
benefit whatsoever, there is no cost associated with over-deterrence in this case. 
 
In the case in which complete deterrence is the socially appropriate goal, there may still 
be some reasons to limit the damage award, but they would have to be based on second-
order deterrence concerns or on concerns that are unrelated to deterrence.  One second-
order concern is marginal deterrence.29  The marginal deterrence concern is that if the 
penalty is set too high, the offender may have an incentive to choose the most harmful of 
a set of harmful options.  For example, imposing the death penalty on purse snatchers 
would give them an incentive to murder their victims in order to facilitate the taking of 
their purses.  The marginal deterrence concern therefore leads us to moderate penalties in 
order to avoid giving the offender an incentive to choose an even more harmful act.  
Another reason for limiting the award in the complete deterrence context is a concern that 
high awards may induce too many people to bring claims to court, which would be costly 
to society, especially if some of the claims are frivolous. 
                                                 
28 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003). 
29 Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Keith N. Hylton, et al. in Support of Respondents, Philip Morris USA 
v. Williams, 05-1256, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1332 (2007) (No. 05-1256), at 11. 
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If, on the other hand, the defendant’s conduct provides some benefits to society (that is, it 
is not uniformly harmful), then complete deterrence of the defendant’s conduct is no 
longer the appropriate goal.  In this case, one should worry about over-deterrence.  In the 
case in which the defendant’s conduct is not uniformly harmful, claim heterogeneity 
provides an important reason for putting a limit on a punitive award.  Indeed, in some 
cases, victim claims will be heterogeneous precisely because the offender’s conduct is 
not uniformly harmful. 
 
Suppose, returning to the numerical example, the offender’s conduct is unambiguously 
fraudulent with respect to 5 of its transactions and not fraudulent with respect to the other 
5.  This might be the case because 5 of the offender’s customers relied on the offender’s 
fraudulent statements, while the other 5 did not rely and would not have changed their 
conduct even if the offender had told the truth.  Presumably, the 5 non-relying purchasers 
gained utility in their transaction with the offender.  In this case, the offender’s conduct 
provides a benefit to society, in the form of enhanced utility to the purchasers who are 
indifferent as to its claims.  Because of this benefit, there is no reason on deterrence 
grounds to reduce the offender’s activity to zero.  A punitive award that attempted to strip 
the gains to the offender from all of its transactions probably would over-deter his 
conduct. 
 
The foregoing example applies to Philip Morris.  Unlike the conduct alleged in State 
Farm, the defendant in Philip Morris could plausibly argue that there was a subset of 
cigarette purchasers who were not victims of fraud.  Victims in this subset would have 
purchased cigarettes even if the companies had accurately disclosed health risks.  This 
suggests that aggregation could lead to socially excessive damages.  It would have been 
quite difficult for the defendant in State Farm to make this argument, because in order to 
do so, State Farm would have had to assert that there were some victims of bad faith 
conduct in the insurance market that did not mind being victimized in this way at all.  
Such an argument would have been preposterous on its face.  But in the context of 
smoking, some consumers of cigarettes apparently do so with full awareness of the health 
risks.  For those consumers, one can only conclude that their perceived utility from 
smoking outweighs the perceived health costs. 
 
C. Determining the Appropriate Punitive Award 
 
What does this imply for punitive awards?  The Supreme Court’s response to these 
issues, which are in the background and inadequately addressed in the opinions, has been 
to attempt to restrain or put a ceiling on punitive damage awards.  That is unhelpful.  It is 
a good approach from the perspective of defendants who may be hit with large punitive 
judgments, but not necessarily good for society.  The proper response is to require the 
litigants to answer the questions about the appropriateness of aggregation or 
multiplication.  That raises the issue of which party (plaintiff or defendant) should have 
the burden of proof on these questions, but I will treat that as subsidiary to the core issue 
of the appropriateness of aggregation. 
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As the foregoing discussion of theory suggests, there are several issues that have to be 
considered in designing the appropriate penalty.  Focus for the moment on the multiplier; 
the case in which a plaintiff seeks a large punitive award to punish the defendant for 
harms done to many other plaintiffs.  If a multiplier is requested, the court needs to 
answer several questions.  First, is the defendant’s conduct uniformly reprehensible (i.e., 
reprehensible with respect to all transactions), so that a complete deterrence policy 
would be appropriate?  If so, then there is no deterrence-based argument for questioning 
an aggregated award when there are many victims.  There may be other bases for 
questioning or challenging the award, but they would be based on something other than 
deterrence, or perhaps what I have described earlier as a second-order deterrence concern 
(e.g., marginal deterrence).  If, on the other hand, the defendant’s conduct is in some 
respects socially beneficial, then the court should be concerned about the possibility of 
over-deterrence.  In this case, the following questions should be considered. 
 
Is the multiplier designed to provide a penalty on behalf of plaintiffs injured in areas 
where defendant’s conduct is legal?  Obviously, a plaintiff should not be able to collect 
on behalf of plaintiffs whose rights have not been violated in any legally recognized 
sense.  As a practical matter this should not be observed much at all.  Punitive damages 
are reserved, under the law, for unambiguously bad conduct.  Conduct that is legal in 
some states and illegal in others usually would not satisfy the reprehensibility 
requirement for a punitive award.  Murder, offensive battery, theft, fraud, and similarly 
bad conduct are illegal everywhere you go, and that is what punitive damages are 
designed to cover.  Still, if it does happen – if the plaintiff obtains a punitive award in 
connection to defendant conduct that is lawful in some states – then courts have a duty to 
disaggregate hypothetical plaintiffs.  Hypothetical plaintiffs whose rights have not been 
violated should have their claims decoupled and discarded. 
 
Next, the court should make a determination – same as in class actions – whether 
individual issues dominate and how much.  Ideally, the court should be able to narrow the 
multiplier to the point that it covers the appropriate penalty for a class of victims with 
homogeneous injury claims.  This implies that in a case involving smokers, a penalty for 
hypothetical plaintiffs should be permitted only for those plaintiffs who match the one in 
court on issues such as reliance, contributory fault, and causation.  Thus, a smoker who 
took up the habit long after the government and industry began issuing regular warnings 
to the public should not be treated as within the same hypothetical plaintiff class as a 
smoker who took up the habit back in the old days when many reputable-seeming sources 
were disputing the possibility that smoking could be harmful. 
 
Consider the following illustration, based loosely on the facts of Philip Morris.  Suppose 
the defendant sells cigarettes, while fraudulently misstating the health risks, to 40,000 
consumers.  The defendant earns, over the relevant period, $10 per consumer.  Half of the 
consumers relied on the fraudulent statements, the other half would have continued to 
purchase the cigarettes even if accurate health-risk information had been provided.30  
                                                 
30 One might argue that it is impossible to know whether half of the consumers relied on the statements of 
the seller.  If it were impossible to find a reasonably accurate estimate of the percentage of consumers who 
were real victims of fraud (i.e., who really relied on the seller’s statements), then it would follow that the 
 11
Since the transactions with 20,000 consumers were unambiguously fraudulent, the gains 
from those transactions should be stripped.  For the fraud victims, the gains to the 
defendant amount to $200,000.  Now suppose the plaintiff receives a compensatory 
award of $100,000.  Under the theory presented here, the minimum gain-stripping award 
is $200,000, which implies a punitive award of $100,000.  Such an award would remove 
all profit from the business of fraudulently misstating health risks to consumers who 
relied on the health disclosures of the seller. 
 
D. Distribution of Punitive Award 
 
After the claim heterogeneity issues are taken into account, the state can do whatever it 
wants with the punitive award under the theory presented here.  It can hand it over to the 
victim.  Or it can put it in a fund for similar victims.  This is simply a matter of 
distribution – or call it a distributive justice concern.  Different states may have different 
notions about how the money should be divvied up.  Of course, given that we want 
someone to sue to stop a perpetrator of fraud, it would make sense to offer the plaintiff 
some nontrivial portion of the punitive award as a bounty. 
 
The goal that should not be sacrificed because of distribution concerns is deterrence.  
Punitive awards and class action awards should exist because they serve an important 
deterrent function in the law.  Without them, the worst offenders will find bad conduct 
profitable, and there are not enough government regulators in the world to stop them.  
 
E. Burdens in Punitive Damages Litigation  
 
Who should have the burden of proof on issues that must be resolved in order to design 
the right penalty?  The ideal regime would be one in which the plaintiff has the burden of 
proof in arguing that an aggregate gain-eliminating penalty, which effectively multiplies 
the gain-stripping portion due solely to the plaintiff, is appropriate.  The defendant should 
have the burden of proof regarding the details of aggregation – i.e., in showing that the 
individualized questions outweigh the common questions to a degree that suggests that 
multiplication would be inappropriate. 
 
Putting the burden of proof on the plaintiff to make the case for a multiplied award 
involves no innovation in the law at all.  Plaintiffs already have the burden to prove that a 
defendant is guilty of negligent or intentionally offensive conduct.  To make the case for 
a multiplied award is simply a matter of proving that there were many other victims other 
than the plaintiff.  In many cases, this will be clear.  Moreover, if the offender’s conduct 
justifies a gain-eliminating award, there should be an immediate presumption that the 
appropriate penalty will be sufficient (at a minimum) to eliminate the offender’s gain.  It 
should be the defendant’s burden from this stage to show that the proposed penalty is too 
large. 
                                                                                                                                                 
approach suggested here could not be implemented.  Individual plaintiffs would have to be satisfied with 
compensatory awards.  The deterrence objective could be pursued through statutory penalties.  However, I 
find it difficult to believe that it would be impossible to find reasonably accurate estimates of the 
percentage of consumers who relied on the seller’s statements. 
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Perhaps the key reason it should be the defendant’s burden to make the case against a 
large punitive award is that such a case often depends on evidence that is privately held 
by the defendant.  It is often the defendant that knows how many victims of its conduct 
exist, and whether it has been fined by other courts for the same conduct.  Once a 
plaintiff has the made the case for a substantial punitive award, the door should be 
opened to the defendant to make the case that the court’s proposed award is unreasonably 
high. 
 
Consider, for example, Philip Morris.  The strongest arguments against the large punitive 
award in that case are (1) that it includes a gain-stripping component for transactions with 
consumers who may not have been victims of fraud (claim heterogeneity) and (2) that it 
may impose or lead to the future imposition of a redundant penalty (redundancy).   
 
The first argument points to the serious difficulty of determining the number of real 
victims of Philip Morris’s deceitful conduct.  Indeed, perhaps Mayola Williams’s 
husband was not a victim of fraud.  There is no way to tell in the abstract.  We are forced 
to rely on the trial court’s finding that he was a victim of fraud.  However many real 
victims existed, it should be clear that the position that there were no real victims is quite 
unlikely to be valid. 
 
Was Mayola Williams’s husband the only real victim of fraud perpetrated by the cigarette 
makers during the period in which he smoked?  To believe so, one would have to think 
that there were virtually no smokers during the relevant time period that would have 
changed their conduct if the cigarette companies had issued the sort of health warnings 
then that they issue today.  Whatever may be the truth of the matter, this is highly 
unlikely.  Among adult males in the U.S., the percentage of smokers is now less than 
24%.31  In 1955, the percentage of smokers among adult males in the U.S. was 56.9%.32  
The lower percentage today reflects a range of factors.  One of them is the greater 
availability of health risk information. 
 
In any event, it should be possible as an empirical matter to determine the percentage of 
smokers within the cohort that included Mayola Williams’s husband that would have 
continued smoking even if the cigarette makers had issued accurate statements about the 
health effects of smoking.33  The party in litigation in the best position to offer such 
evidence is Philip Morris.  The cigarette companies have studied the reactions of 
consumers to various advertising campaigns.34 
                                                 
31 “Fact Sheet: Adult Smoking in the United States: Current Estimates,” Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/Factsheets/adult_cig_smoking.htm.  
32 Id. 
33 As I noted earlier, one could take the position that it is impossible to determine the percentage of smokers 
within the relevant cohort who relied on the statements of cigarette sellers.  If this position were valid, it 
would follow that one could not determine an appropriate aggregate gain-stripping penalty.  However, I 
find this position implausible, and in any event it should be subjected to empirical investigation to 
determine whether it has any merit. 
34 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market 
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1467-1552 (1999). 
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With respect to the second issue, redundancy, it should be clear that Philip Morris is 
capable of proving in the current litigation, or in any future trial, that it has already paid a 
penalty on behalf of fraud victims within the same cohort as Mayola Williams’s husband.  
This is evidence that is obviously in the hands of the defendant and could be presented to 
the court with ease. 
 
In general, the law should be structured so that the party with the best information on 
claim heterogeneity or redundancy should have an incentive to reveal that information in 
court.  In the typical case involving an offender whose conduct has harmed a large 
number of victims, it will be the offender that is in the best position to know whether the 
victims have heterogeneous injury claims or whether it has paid a penalty on behalf of the 
victims already. 
 
F. A Suggested Approach to Determination and Review 
 
The extremely important details considered to this point do not disturb the fundamental 
theoretical bases for punitive awards.  The details may be so important that they lead to a 
completely different result than that suggested by theory and a broad-brush description of 
the facts.  For example, the reliance finding alone, in a fraud case, might be based on 
such questionable evidence that it should not be allowed to stand as justification for a 
large award. 
 
It is important, however, for courts to distinguish basic theory from matters of detail.  
And the Supreme Court has not come close to doing this, largely because it has not 
attempted to set out the theoretical basis for punitive awards.  In other words, the 
theoretical explanations that the court has willingly examined in some areas, such as 
antitrust, remain an unexplored terrain in the context of punitive damages.  As a result, 
the court has produced confusing opinions that fail to articulate principles for determining 
whether a punitive award is appropriate. 
 
The account given here suggests an algorithm of the following sort for determining and 
reviewing punitive awards.  If the defendant is found guilty of some reprehensible act 
that justifies a punitive award, the initial presumption should be that there will be a 
punitive award that is no less than the amount required to strip gains from transactions 
with or conduct harming the victims.  Moreover, if the conduct is truly reprehensible, this 
amount should be considered a minimum level which courts can exceed at their 
discretion. 
 
To minimize the risk of erroneous punitive judgments, courts should adopt a “clear and 
convincing” standard with respect to the reprehensibility test.35  If the appellate court 
reviewing a punitive award is still in doubt as to whether the offender’s conduct satisfied 
                                                 
35 This is consistent with the law of most states, see, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, Punitive Damages in Rhetoric 
and  Reality: An Integrated Empirical Analysis of Punitive Damages Judgments in Hawaii, 1985-2001, 20 
J. Law & Politics 143, 185 (2004). 
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the reprehensibility requirement, it should seek to constrain the punitive award to the 
minimum gain-stripping level.36 
 
If the plaintiff has satisfied the standards required to obtain a punitive award, it should be 
the responsibility of the defendant to offer arguments and evidence favoring a reduction 
in the award.  If, for example, there is uncertainty as to whether a reprehensible act 
occurred, the defendant will have every incentive to bring this uncertainty to the court’s 
attention.  It should be the defendant’s responsibility to do so, rather than the plaintiff’s 
responsibility to prove the negative proposition that there is no uncertainty.  If the 
defendant has already paid the penalty that is part of the punitive judgment, this should be 
a reason to reduce the award, and the defendant should have the responsibility to bring 
this to the court’s attention.  If the punitive award aggregates claims that are 
heterogeneous, this may be a basis for reducing the punitive award, provided that there is 
some evidence that the defendant’s conduct was not uniformly socially undesirable.37  It 
should be the defendant’s responsibility, not the plaintiff’s, to bring these arguments to 
the court’s attention. 
 
Since states have developed reasonable rules regarding the requirements for a punitive 
award, the Supreme Court’s most useful decision would be to remove itself from 
regulating the substance of punitive awards, and to return to the pre-Gore emphasis on 
procedure.  The Supreme Court should adopt doctrines that require strong proof of 
reprehensibility and effectively require lower courts to permit defendants to challenge 
awards on the grounds suggested here.  
 
 
IV. Philip Morris 
 
As I said before, the ideal approach to punitive damages elaborated above, and outlined 
in my amicus brief, apparently had no effect on the Supreme Court’s decision in Philip 
Morris.  I find some consolation in the fact that the arguments of the law-and-economics 
gunslingers on Philip Morris’s side, Steve Shavell and Mitch Polinsky, were also ignored 
by the Court. 
 
Instead of grappling with the theory of deterrence, the Court adopted a theory of 
procedural due process under which it is unconstitutional to do precisely what deterrence 
theory indicates one should do in the case of a recidivist, infrequently punished, 
wrongdoer.  Consider the case of a wrongdoer who steals $100 from one victim every 
day, and is punished with a monetary fine for only 50 percent of those harms.  Deterrence 
theory requires a penalty of at least $200 in each instance of punishment.  Yet the Court 
                                                 
36 Brief of Keith N. Hylton as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No. 01-1289), at 28-30. 
37 In some cases, claim heterogeneity alone may provide a sufficient basis for limiting the award.  Consider 
Philip Morris.  An aggregated gain-stripping judgment poses the risk of imposing on the defendant a 
penalty for transactions with smokers who did not care whether they were being told the truth about health 
risks (i.e., smokers who did not rely on the firm’s statements).  The existence of these types within the 
hypothetical victim class is a consequence of the fact that the firm’s conduct was not fraudulent with 
respect to all smokers within the Jesse Williams’s cohort. 
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has adopted a theory of due process that apparently forecloses this very sensible solution 
to a common problem, in the context of punitive damages.  This is troubling on a number 
of grounds. 
 
First, as noted in the previous parts, the concern that most clearly motivated the Court’s 
decision in Philip Morris, claim heterogeneity, is observed in the class action setting as 
well.  The courts have been eager, because of the same issues underlying the Court’s due 
process concerns with respect to punitive damages, to adopt rules that ensure that claim 
aggregation does not occur, in the class action setting, with respect to heterogeneous 
claims.38  The same rules that are in the process of development in the class action 
context could have been imported to the punitive damages case law. 
 
Second, the Court’s theory of due process implies that class actions are unconstitutional.  
Indeed, if I were a lawyer representing defendants in class actions, I would have started 
strategizing, within minutes of reading the decision, on how to use Philip Morris to put 
an end to class action lawsuits.  The reason is easy to state.  The differences between 
class actions and many punitive damages lawsuits are, from an economic perspective, 
slight.39  Plaintiffs are seeking aggregated judgments in class action lawsuits and in many 
punitive damages lawsuits.  In the punitive damages lawsuit, there is only one plaintiff in 
court.  In the class action lawsuit, the class is only there in theory, not in fact.  The only 
real plaintiffs are the class representatives. If the Due Process Clause does not permit a 
court to impose a damage award or penalty behalf of “persons who are not before the 
court”,40 then it would appear to invalidate class action lawsuits.  The Court’s argument 
in Philip Morris applies so easily to class actions that it would seem to be professionally 
irresponsible for class action defense attorneys not to press this point until it is resolved 
by the Court. 
 
Admittedly, one can draw technical distinctions between class actions and punitive 
damages lawsuits.  One could argue, for example, that the punitive award goes only to 
one victim while the class award goes to the entire class of victims.  But this distinction is 
weakened by the existence of split-award statutes that distribute the proceeds of punitive 
judgments to others.  And presumably any court could approve a settlement in a punitive 
damages case that creates a fund for similar victims not in court, thereby converting a 
punitive damages lawsuit into a class action lawsuit.  Alternatively, one could argue that 
the punitive damages plaintiff is not necessarily representative of the class of victims not 
present in court, while the class action representatives are.  But this argument can be met 
by, as I have already argued, adopting rules that effectively require representative status 
on the part of the punitive damages plaintiff by preventing multiplication of 
                                                 
38 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (holding that a class must satisfy the tests 
of common issue predominance and adequacy of representation). 
39 Indeed, many punitive damages claims against corporations will be for products that injure many people.  
In this context, punitive damages claims serve the same deterrence function as class-action lawsuits.  
Another type of punitive damages claim will arise in connection with some intentional tort that occurs 
between one offender and one victim – such as punch in the nose.  In this class of cases, punitive damages 
have no connection at all to class actions.  However, it is obvious that Philip Morris does not apply to this 
second class of punitive damages claim.   
40 Philip Morris USA, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1332, at *6. 
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heterogeneous missing-victim claims.  In terms of the fundamental deterrence objectives, 
class action and punitive damages lawsuits are, in many instances, equivalent.   
 
Third, Philip Morris will encourage obfuscation and dishonesty from lower courts more 
than straightforward analysis of the grounds for a punitive award.  Philip Morris instructs 
courts that it is permissible to consider harm to other victims in determining 
reprehensibility, but impermissible to actually increase an award in an effort to punish the 
defendant for the harms inflicted on others.  It is a distinction that many will find 
confusing, as dissenting opinions noted.  Moreover, it is a distinction that will encourage 
lower courts to simply say nothing about the function of a punitive judgment.  The surest 
method for a court to avoid review under Philip Morris is to talk about reprehensibility, 
and then to say nothing more than that the punitive award it has imposed is a proper 
response to the defendant’s reprehensible conduct toward the victim.  If the court thinks 
that the award is appropriate because it penalizes the defendant for conduct toward many 
victims, it is not in the court’s interests, after Philip Morris, to say so.  That is an outcome 
that serves no one’s interests. 
 
In addition to creating confusion and encouraging dishonesty, the rule of Philip Morris is 
unlikely to provide any substantial benefit to potential defendants.  Again, consider the 
basic proposition that harm to others can be taken into account in the reprehensibility 
analysis, but not in the calculation of the punitive award.  This proposition is 
incomprehensible, because it says that an award can be increased on the basis of 
reprehensibility, which is a function of harm to others, but cannot be increased in order 
directly to punish for the harm done or threatened to others.  The end result will be that 
lower courts will focus entirely on the reprehensibility matter, and continue in effect to 
increase awards to reflect harm done to others.  But because the Supreme Court has now 
prevented lower courts from addressing the harm to others in a direct and straightforward 
way, it has made it more difficult for reviewing courts to determine whether in fact a 
penalty is excessive on social welfare grounds – say because it is a redundant penalty.  
Indeed, the risk of redundant penalties in punitive damages litigation is probably 
enhanced by the Philip Morris decision.  
 
Given the alternative approaches available, the only sturdy reason that can be discerned 
for the Court’s decision is the notion that every person not before the court is capable of 
bringing his own lawsuit and having it decided on the basis of the issues in his case.  
While this sounds fine in theory, it is far from what happens in real life.  The truth is that 
relatively few people bring lawsuits.  For example, the vast majority of medical 
malpractice victims do not sue.41  A constitutional doctrine that prohibits punitive 
damage judgments and class actions on the ground that each individual should bring his 
own lawsuit has only one predictable effect: injurers will be effectively shielded from 
liability for torts that affect many victims. 
 
                                                 
41 A. Russell Localio, et al., The Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to 
Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study III, 325 New England J. Medicine 245-251, 
245 (1991) (roughly 1 out of 7 patients injured by medical negligence bring suit). 
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Moreover, the notion that a multiplied or aggregated punishment is inappropriate because 
every victim is capable of suing on his own is hard to square with state statutes that allow 
for multiple damages (e.g., consumer fraud statutes that provide for treble damages).  
Treble damages provisions are often based on the notion that they punish the offender for 
the wrongs for which he would otherwise not be punished.  If it is a violation of due 
process for a state court to use a punitive judgment to punish a defendant for harms to 
missing victims, then it would seem that a state statute requiring trebling of damages 
raises the same due process concerns.  What, for example, would be the Court’s response 
if Oregon were to pass a statute trebling damages for every smoker who prevails in a 
fraud action against a cigarette company?  Statutes already exist at the state level 
providing multiple damages in consumer fraud actions.  The justification for many of 
these statues is the same that would be used to justify a punitive judgment.  Are such 
statutes unconstitutional under Philip Morris? 
 
 
V. Implications for Pain and Suffering 
 
It is strange that the tort reform movement, as reflected in the Supreme Court, has 
focused on punitive damages rather than pain and suffering awards.  The notice issues 
identified by the Court in State Farm apply equally well, and perhaps better, to pain and 
suffering awards.  In addition, the theoretical case for pain and suffering awards, unlike 
that for punitive damages, has always been murky and contested.  Finally, pain and 
suffering awards occur frequently and have a noticeable and unavoidable effect on the 
tort system.  Punitive damages, in contrast, are rare. 
 
Pain and suffering awards are difficult to justify.  Much of what I will say here can be 
traced, with some work of course, to Calabresi and Melamed’s famous article on 
remedies.42  The strongest economic justification for pain and suffering awards comes in 
the context of “property rule violations”, i.e., expropriations of some sort (e.g., theft, 
battery, rape).  The law governing remedies for property and bodily integrity gives the 
potential victim the right to enjoin a taking, which means that the potential victim can 
demand from the potential offender a payment that compensates for the subjective losses 
that would be suffered by the victim from transferring his entitlement to the offender.  In 
view of this, it would be sensible for the law of damages to include a subjective 
component when there has been a taking of some sort.  Pain and suffering awards in the 
context of takings are therefore justifiable on the basis of the economic literature on 
property rules.43 
 
The other context in which a subjective element is sensible in light of the economic 
literature is when the offender’s conduct is always socially undesirable.  Threatened 
conduct that is always socially undesirable, such as speeding in the wrong direction on a 
                                                 
42 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
43 Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 137, 178-183 
(2006). 
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road, probably would be enjoined by a court.  Given this, a damage award that includes a 
subjective component is consistent with basic economic principles. 
 
Indeed, punitive awards can sometimes be justified as compensation for subjective losses.  
Pain and suffering awards in the two settings just described – takings and always-
socially-undesirable conduct – would be justifiable on grounds that are somewhat similar 
to the justification for punitive damages.  However, the theoretical function of punitive 
damage awards differs greatly from that of pain and suffering awards.  Punitive awards 
are designed to deter.  Pain and suffering awards are designed to compensate for the 
subjective loss suffered by the victim.  If a court gives a punitive award that is actually 
designed to compensate for pain and suffering, then it may be acting in an economically 
defensible manner while confusing categories. 
 
In the context of ordinary negligent acts, such as a mistake due to negligence in the 
medical setting, a damage judgment requiring compensation of objective losses is the 
approach adopted by courts and accepted in the theory of damages.  We know that 
victims often suffer subjective losses in these cases.  However, the law has not given 
potential victims a right to enjoin this conduct, as a means of demanding compensation 
for threatened subjective losses.  When the law of damages permits compensation for 
subjective losses in these cases, at it does, it permits plaintiffs to obtain indirectly through 
damages what it has denied plaintiffs the right to obtain directly through equitable 
remedies.  This is inconsistent and difficult to justify.44 
 
Because subjective losses exist, perhaps a case can be made on cost-benefit grounds for 
including a component for subjective losses in ordinary damage remedies for 
negligence.45  However, it would appear to be desirable in this case to schedule the 
subjective component in order to make it more predictable and consistent across cases. 
 
The upshot of this theory is that pain and suffering awards in the context of takings and 
always-socially-undesirable conduct are justifiable on economic grounds.  That is, in the 
traditional categories in which punitive damages would be awarded on reprehensibility 
grounds, which strongly overlaps with takings and always-socially-undesirable 
categories, pain and suffering awards for subjective losses serve the socially desirable 
purpose of providing a proxy form of compensation for subjective losses. However, in 
the context of ordinary negligence, pain and suffering awards do not have a firm basis in 
the theory of remedies.46 
 
If the Supreme Court adheres to Philip Morris, I would predict that pain and suffering 
awards are next on the substantive-due-process chopping block.  The arguments that 
imply constitutional impermissibility in the punitive damages context imply the same 
with greater force in the case of pain and suffering awards.  Perhaps the best that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers can hope for in this scenario is a rule from the Court requiring the 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 169, 182. 
46 Id. at 182-183. 
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scheduling of pain and suffering award in order to remain within the requirements of the 





I return to the question I raised at the start: why, in spite of the business lobby’s support 
for the decisions in State Farm and Philip Morris, have we observed a rather confused set 
of political alliances on the question of punitive damages?  The answer is simple.  
Political moderates and conservatives include, in addition to the business lobby, groups 
that have an old-fashioned belief that bad conduct deserves punishment.  This is quite 
obviously the motivation that led the Utah courts to uphold large punitive judgments 
against State Farm, to the point of coming close to defying the Supreme Court on 
remand.  The Oregon courts in Philip Morris have also come close to defiance, probably 
for the same reasons as the Utah courts.  I think that defiance is what we will continue to 
observe until the Court adopts a rational policy on punitive damages.     
 
A rational policy on punitive damages would give the Court a set of consistent guidelines 
for determining the appropriate award and for reviewing an award on appeal.  The 
Court’s decisions in Gore and State Farm have suggested vague constraints (e.g., single 
digit ratio of punitive to compensatory damages) while failing to provide useful guidance 
on punitive damages.  Philip Morris, with its claim that considering harms to others is 
permissible as part of the reprehensibility analysis but not as part of the actual calculation 
of a punitive judgment, also fails to provide clear guidance.  The reason for this failure is 
that the Court has refused to closely examine the theoretical rationales for punitive 
awards and to use those rationales as a basis for its doctrine. 
 
